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Thompson: Thompson: Consumer Banktuptcy

CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY:
SUBSTANTIAL ABUSE
AND SECTION 707 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy originated

as a means to ensure the equitable

distribution of a debtor's assets when those assets are insufficient to pay
his debts in full.' Congress also intended that the bankruptcy laws
would ensure the equitable treatment of creditors, and at the same time
provide the debtor with the so-called "fresh start." There are those who
feel that the bankruptcy laws have evolved into something very different
than the equitable remedy envisioned. They would say that the
bankruptcy laws have "evolved into a method of escaping those debts at
little or no sacrifice."2 As a result of this belief, these individuals and
groups have initiated various changes in the bankruptcy laws, among
them the so called "Consumer Credit Amendments. 3
Bankruptcies can take a number of forms depending upon the
nature of the debtor's obligations. Businesses and individuals alike
have a number of alternatives to weigh in determining which chapter
of the bankruptcy
code they will use to seek protection from their
4
creditors.
A consumer bankruptcy usually takes one of two forms: a Chapter
7 liquidation or a Chapter 13 wage earner plan. 6 In a Chapter 7

1. Breitowitz, New Developments in Consumer Bankruptcies: Chapter 7
Dismissal on the Basis of "SubstantialAbuse", 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (1985).
2. Id at 327, 328.
3. Gross, PreservingAFreshStartFor The IndividualDebtor: The CaseFor
Narrow ConstructionOf The Consumer CreditAmendments, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
59, 60-62 (1986).
4. Businesses and consumers alike can elect a Chapter 7 liquidation.
Chapter 11 reorganization is available to businesses and in certain circumstances to individuals. Individuals also have the option to elect a Chapter 13
"1wage earner" plan. In addition, farmers have the option of electing a Chapter
12 bankruptcy. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
5. 11 U.S.C. ch. 7 (1988).
6. 11 U.S.C. ch. 13 (1988). Under certain circumstances an individual may
also elect to enter a Chapter 11 reorganization. See In re Moog, 774 F.2d 1073
(11th Cir. 1985). See generally B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRuPTcY LAW
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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proceeding all of the debtor's non-exempt property7 is liquidated and
the proceeds are distributed to creditors. Any deficiency is discharged,
subject to certain limitations.8 This discharge has given debtors a so
called "fresh start" and a chance to begin their financial life anew. The
fresh start has an important and significant place in our national
history because bankruptcy was one of the protections granted by the
framers of the Constitution.9 The Supreme Court has acknowledged
the importance and purpose behind the theory of the fresh start:
The power of the individual to earn a living for himself and those
dependent upon him is in the nature of a personal liberty quite as
much as, if not more than, it is a property right. To preserve its free
exercise is of the utmost importance, not only because it is a fundamental private necessity, but because it is a matter of great public
concern. From the viewpoint of the wage-earner there is little
difference between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor
....

The new opportunity in life and the clear field for future effort,

which it is the purpose of the bankruptcy act to afford the emancipated debtor, would be of little value to the wage-earner if he were
obliged to face the necessity of devoting the whole or a considerable
portion of his earnings for an indefinite time in the future to the
payment of indebtedness incurred prior to his bankruptcy."0
A Chapter 13 plan involves the commitment to a repayment of some
portion of the debtor's future earnings in exchange for the right to
retain at least some of the otherwise non-exempt property which would
otherwise be subject to liquidation in a Chapter 7 proceeding."
Until recently, a debtor desiring Chapter 7 relief had an "unfettered
choice to elect a no-asset chapter 7 liquidation."' 12 Unlike a Chapter 7,
which in certain circumstances can be initiated by creditors, a Chapter
13 proceeding is entirely voluntary. 13
Creditors could not force

MANUAL 8-11 (1986).
7. Non-exempt property is that property which is excluded from the
bankrupt's estate either by operation of state law or by federal statute. See 11
U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
8. Certain debts are not dischargeable and the debtor will continue to be
liable for those, notwithstanding the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. §
523 (1988).

9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
10. Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988).
12. Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 328. Under 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988), any
person may seek relief under Chapter 7 except railroads, insurance companies
and banks. Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 328 n.10,
13. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/19
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debtors to utilize any of their future income to satisfy their debts by
forcing them into a Chapter 13.14 As a result, in a number of cases
debtors who could have paid a significant portion of their unsecured
obligations through a commitment of future income failed to do so and
received a discharge of their obligations in a Chapter 7 proceeding while
their creditors received little or nothing. Creditors pressured Congress
to pass bankruptcy reform legislation aimed at curtailing the right of
debtors to utilize a Chapter 7 proceeding.
II.

HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENTS

The credit industry" had mobilized as early as 1980 in an attempt
to curtail the access of debtors to Chapter 7 relief.'" This move was
brought about by the increasingly popular perception that people were
using the bankruptcy system, not to extricate themselves from an
unfortunate situation, but rather as a method of avoiding debts even
though they were not suffering economic hardship and possessed future
income sufficient to meet their obligations.'" According to the consumer credit industry, this "needless discharge" of debt led to the shifting
of the repayment burden for literally billions of dollars of debt to the
public at large, and principally to those
who utilized consumer credit at
8
increasingly higher interest rates.'
Much of the empirical evidence used to support the proposition that
debtors who possessed the ability to repay were discharging debt
needlessly was provided in a study conducted by the Credit Research
Center, Krannert Graduate School of Management, at Purdue University. The credit industry paid for the study and it was an influential
document in the adoption of the Consumer Credit Amendments 9 The

14. Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 328 n.10.
15. The credit industry is not officially represented by any single group, but
the legislative hearings contain testimony from such groups as the Credit Union
National Association, the National Association of Federal Credit Unions, the
National Consumer Finance Association, the American Retail Federation and
the National Retail Merchants Association. Gross, supra note 3, at 61 n.4.
16. Breitowitz, supra note 1, at 328 n.12 (citing Ginsberg, The Proposed
Bankruptcy ImprovementAct: The CreditorsStrike Back, 1982 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
1). The predecessor to the amendments, which were ultimately passed in 1984,
was S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982), proposed in earlier sessions of
Congress.
17. In re Grant, 51 Bankr. 385, 390 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
18. Breitowitz, supranote 1, at 336-41.
19. Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, Rejoinder: Limiting Access To
Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 WIs. L. REv. 1087. For a discussion of the
Consumer Credit Amendments, see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 19
250

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

results of this study indicated that debtors seeking Chapter 7 relief had
the ability each year to collectively repay 1.1 billion dollars of debt.
Because of this fact these debtors should be denied access to Chapter 7
and they should be forced to elect a Chapter 13 or forego the protection
0
offered by the bankruptcy statutes.2
This study was not without its detractors. Professors Sullivan,
22
Warren, and Westbrook 2 ' authored a critical analysis of the study,
citing what they identified as a number of shortcomings within the
study and labeling it as an "adversarial document."' In making the
claim that debtors could have repaid as much as 1.1 billion dollars of
debt that was being discharged in bankruptcy each year,2 the study
assumed that the present level of income for all debtors would remain
the same, without interruption, for the next five years. 2' Given the
demonstrated erratic employment history of debtors finding themselves
in bankruptcy, this was a risky assumption. Additionally, the study
made this claim based upon the calculation of allowed expenses at the
Federal poverty level; 26 it is not clear at all that under Chapter 13
courts would restrict the allowed expenses of the debtor to these low
levels in calculating the debtor's disposable income. Notwithstanding
these criticisms, the conclusions presented in the Purdue study found
27
widespread acceptance with Congress and the press.
III. SECTION 707(b)
Even though earlier attempts to address these perceived problems
in the Bankruptcy Code had failed,' many substantive changes to the
Co-le were made with the passage of the Consumer Credit Amendments
(Amendment(s)) in July of 1984.' The Amendments, as finally passed,
were much less solicitous of creditor interests than the earlier revisions

20. See id.
21. Id. at 1087.
22. Id. at 1088-90.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1093.
26. Id at 1088.
27. Id. at 1087.
28. Earlier bills had been introduced in previous sessions of Congress but
had failed to gain the support needed to pass and become law.
29. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). Subtitle A of Title III of Pub. L. No. 98-353 is entitled
the "Consumer Credit Amendments."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/19
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which had been offered,' but they still represented substantive
changes in the Code for consumer bankruptcies.
One of the most significant changes was the addition of subsection
(b) to section 707 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. It states:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion and not at the
request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed
by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a
substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor."
This addition represents a marked change from the previous
position taken in the Bankruptcy Code. As stated earlier, debtors
electing to file for Chapter 7 relief had enjoyed "unfettered access" to the
Code absent some egregious misconduct described in section 727 of the
Code.3
In interpreting section 707(b), the determination of what is
"primarily consumer debt" and what is "substantial abuse" along with
the application of the standards have created significant issues for the
courts to resolve. The result has been a less than uniform application
of the law.
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 707(b) has been very influential in
the determination of what constitutes substantial abuse as contemplated
by the Code. The Amendments were the product of substantial debate
and negotiation between the proponents and the opponents of the
legislation. The final Amendmeht to section 707, as passed, was not
accompanied by an official committee rep6rt. Therefore, no formal
legislative history exists and the courts have felt free to rummage
through the closet of the Congressional Record to find the legislative

30. S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982), an amendment package offer'ed
but not passed in 1982, was far more restrictive of the rights of debtors than the
amendments which were ultimately passed in 1984. See Broitowitz, supranote
1, at 329.
31. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 312, 98 Stat. 333, 355.
32. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (Supp. 1984). This section was later amended by the
addition of language allowing the United States trustee to raise the motion of
substantial abuse. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302 (1986) (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b) (1988)).
33. Section 727 provides a list of 10 acts which work to deny a debtor
discharge in a Chapter 7 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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history that seems appropriate in the particular case. In sifting through
the reports, the reader finds a veritable smorgasbord of comments from
which to choose in justifying a particular interpretation of legislative
intent. The courts have not hesitated to do just that. For example, in
In re Walton,34 a case decided by the Eighth Circuit, the majority
refused to consider the statements of legislators made when the
legislation was passed. The court cited a Ninth Circuit case, In re
Kelly,' which in turn cited a recent Supreme Court case, saying
that "'[tlo the extent that legislative history may be considered, it is the
official committee reports that provide the authoritative expression of
legislative intent,' not the 'stray comments by individual legislators."'37
The Ninth Circuit, in Kelly, turned to the committee reports on Senate
Bill 445 (S. 445),38 predecessor to the bill ultimately passed, as "the
best available evidence of Congress' intent in enacting section
707(b)." 39 The Eighth Circuit adopted this reasoning in Walton.4 9
The consideration of the legislative history of S. 445 was anticipated by
Congress and both the proponents and opponents of the legislation
expressly agreed that the legislative history of S. 445 was applicable to
the larger bill of bankruptcy reform.4'
The Amendment, as advanced, represented a major change from the
bills originally proposed, primarily because of vehement opposition to
the original bills from Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy. 42 These
early proposals contained a mechanical formula for determining the
43
ability of the debtor to repay his obligations out of future income.
The opposition of Senators Metzenbaum and Kennedy prompted
negotiations between the proponents and the opponents of the legislation. They resolved the disagreement by deleting language which
considered the future income of the debtor in the application of the
substantial abuse standard. 4 Senator Metzenbaum made clear his
understanding that he had "successfully worked out with the author of

34. 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
35. 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
36. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984).
37. Walton, 866 F.2d at 983 (quoting In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
38. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
39. Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914 n.7.
40. Walton, 866 F.2d at 983.
41. 129 CONG. REc. S5359 (daily ed, Apr. 27, 1983) (remarks of Sens.
Metzenbaum and Dole).
42. Id
43. I& (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
44. Id- at 85359 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); i& at S5359-S5361 (remarks
of Sen. Metzenbaum).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/19
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this amendment the total elimination of the future income language
....
[The future income matter is no longer in the legislation."4
House Bill 5174 (H.R. 5174)46 contained language that resembled
the substantial-abuse language of S. 445. Representative Rodino
remarked that the proposed amendment to section 707(b) "would not
create a future income test., 47 During consideration of H.R. 5174 on
the floor of the House following the conference, Committee Chairman
Rodino remarked that "the conferees did not alter the consumer credit
amendments. These amendments are fair to both
debtors and creditors,
48
and contain no threshold or future income test.M
The Ninth Circuit in Kelly determined that the statements of
Senator Metzenbaum and Representative Rodino (quoted above)
indicated that the future income test had been eliminated from the bill,
but in no way did this "suggest that a debtor's ability to repay his debts
49
is no longer a consideration in determining whether there is abuse.1
In fact:
[The committee report on the final version of S. 445 states clearly
that dismissal for substantial abuse is intended to "uphold[] creditors'
interests in obtaining repayment where such repayment would not be
a burden," and that "if a debtor can meet his debts without difficulty
as they become due, use of Chapter 7 would represent a substantial
'
abuse. 50
The use of the legislative history of a predecessor bill, rejected by
committee and subjected to several amendments prior to passage, to
determine the legislative intent of legislation passed at a later time, is
the type of judicial interpretation which led Antonin Scalia, Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court to question the reliability
of legislative history in determining Congressional intent.5 '

45. Id. at S5361 (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum).
46. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
47. 130 CONG. REc. H1941 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1984) (remarks of Rep.
Rodino).
48. 130 CONG. REc. H7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984); see also Block-Lieb,
Using Legislative History To Interpret 1984 Amendments To Sections 548 and
707, 10 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR 2 (1986).

49. Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914.
50. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53, 54 (1983)).
51. Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice; 74 VIR. L. REv.
423, 437-46 (1988) (discusses Justice Scalia's view on the use of legislative
history in statutory interpretation).
Associate Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the Earl F. Nelson lecture to an
assembly of law students at the University of Missouri-Columbia on September
20, 1989, in which he addressed the questionable manner in which the courts
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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B. The Elements of Section 707(b)
1. Substantial Abuse
Substantial abuse is the standard set forth in section 707(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code for determining whether the court should dismiss the
debtor's petition as an abuse of Chapter 7 of the Code.52 Substantial
abuse is not defined within the Code. Substantial abuse implies that
the debtor has obtained "some kind of an unfair advantage... against
his creditors." 53 One court has dismissed a petition "upon the simple
judgment that it is unfair and inequitable for a debtor to request that
this Court discharge his debts while he accumulates substantial
disposable income over the next several years while living a relatively
high life style. " 54
The dispute over what constitutes substantial abuse has focused
primarily upon the ability of the debtor to repay some or all of his or her
debts out of future income. The threshold questions are twofold: first,
whether ability to repay is a factor that should be considered at all, and
second, if it is to be considered, what percentage of repayment over what
time period should constitute substantial abuse? While a few courts and
commentators have argued that ability to repay is not a proper factor
for consideration, 55 the vast majority of the courts have declined to
follow that reasoning and have considered a number of factors including
an ability to repay, in making the substantial abuse determination.
Courts have considered the following factors:
1. Whether the debtors have a likelihood of sufficient future income
to fund a Chapter 13 plan which would pay a substantial portion of
the unsecured claims;
2. Whether the debtors petition was filed as a consequence of illness,
disability, unemployment or some other calamity;
3. Whether the schedules suggest the debtor incurred cash advancements and consumer purchases in excess of their ability to repay
them;
4. Whether the debtors proposed family budget is excessive or
extravagant;

have utilized legislative history in an attempt to divine legislative intent.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
53. In re White, 49 Bankr. 869, 875 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1985).
54. In re Bell, 56 Bankr. 637, 643 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
55. See In re Keniston, 60 Bankr. 742 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986); see generally
Gross, supranote 3.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/19
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5. Whether the debtors Statement of Income and Expenses is
misrepresentative of their true financial condition.'
The courts that have applied these factors have placed particular
emphasis upon the ability of the debtor to repay unsecured debts out of
future income.57 For example, the court in In re Grant8 determined
that it would be a substantial abuse to allow a debtor, who could repay
68% of his unsecured debts by reducing his standard of living, to receive
Chapter 7 relief. Similarly, in In re Gaskins,5 9 the court determined
that a debtor who could repay 54% of his unsecured debts was undeserving of Chapter 7 relief.
It is noteworthy that the Grant court, in concluding that the debtor
was able to repay 68% of his unsecured debt, did so on the basis of a
five year repayment plan.60 One can question the legitimacy of this
determination considering that, in a Chapter 13 plan, if the debtor
proposes to pay less than 100% of his unsecured debts, the Court will
not confirm the plan unless it provides for the payment of all the
debtor's disposable income over a period of three years. 61 In other
words, the judge in Grant, in evaluating the debtor's Chapter 7 petition,
applied a Chapter 13 type repayment period that she could not have
required if the debtor actually had filed a Chapter 13 petition.62 The
application of a five year repayment period has not been confined to the
Grant court.6
Factors other than the ability of the debtor to repay his or her debts
should be considered in determining whether substantial abuse exists
because the other factors may tend to aggravate or mitigate the
abusiveness of the filing."4 "[I]lilness or other calamity which prompted
the filing, obtaining of cash advances without intent to repay, the

56. In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874,878 (Bankr. N.D. 1985); see also In re Grant,
51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re White, 49 Bankr. 869 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1985).
57. In re Busbin, 95 Bankr. 240 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); In re Newsom, 69
Bankr. 801 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987).
58. 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
59. 85 Bankr. 846 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988).
60. Grant, 51 Bankr. at 394.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (1988).
62. Id. For a discussion of the fact that extension of the repayment period
provided for by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988) should be extended from three years
to five only at the option of the debtor, see In re Capodanno, 94 Bankr. 62, 66
n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) and the authorities cited therein.
63. See, e.g., In re Newsom, 69 Bankr. 801, 805 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987); In re
Cord, 68 Bankr. 5 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
64. In re Herbst, 95 Bankr. 98, 101 (W.D. Wis. -1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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nature of the proposed budget of the debtor, and misrepresentation of
schedules filed with the court" should be considered. 5
a. Raising the Issue of SubstantialAbuse
Section 707(b) provides that "[a]fter notice and a hearing, the court,
on its own motion or on a motion by the United States .Trustee,m but
not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss
a case."6 7 One court,68 has stated that the reason that creditors are
not permitted to raise the issue of substantial abuse is that "[e]very
creditor feels that a bankruptcy discharge constitutes a substantial
abuse. ' 9 This provision permitting only the court or the U.S. Trustee
to raise the issue of substantial abuse, has been interpreted to include
the panel or case trustee.7 Congress itself intended "[t]he 'party in
interest' phrase in section 707(b) ... to mean creditors-not panel
trustees."7 '
What is less than clear, however, is whether a violation of the
section forbidding creditors to move for a dismissal will foreclose the
substantial abuse issue. In this area the courts are divided. In In- re
72
Latimer,
the court concluded that when the creditor's "suggestion"
that the case was appropriate for a section 707(b) dismissal preceded
any action by the court, the proceeding was tainted and foreclosed a
section 707(b) dismissal on the merits.73
The Third Circuit declined to decide the "taint" issue in In re
74 because it
Christian
was not presented properly on appeal.7" In a
footnote, however, the court stated that congressional intent appeared
to allow the court to consider a dismissal under section 707(b) even after
a party in interest had moved improperly for dismissal.7

65. Id.
66. The language allowing the United States Trustee to raise the substantial
abuse issue was added by amendment in 1986. Previously only the court was
authorized to raise the issue. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
68. In re Ploegert, 93 Bankr. 641 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1988).
69. Id. at 641.
70. Id. at 641-42.
71. Id. at 642 (quoting 132 CONG. REc. H9000 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1986)
(statement of Rep. Fish)).
72. 82 Bankr. 354, 362 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
73. Id.; see also In re Cecil, 71 Bankr. 730 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987).
74. 804 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 49.
76. Id. at 48.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/19
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The In re Hudson7 7 court addressed the dilemma posed by a party
in interest raising the issue of substantial abuse. According to the court,
even though foreclosing the issue upon violation would have a deterrent
effect upon creditors, at the same time it would prevent "the Court from
acting in cases where an abuse of Title 11 Chapter 7 is most likely to be
occurring."78 The court concluded that "[i]f given the choice as to
which of these violations should be overlooked, this Court believes that
public policy and equity require that it be the [raising of the issue by a
party in interest]. 7 9
When the prohibition against a party in interest moving the court
on the issue of substantial abuse is read in the context of the presumption favoring the relief requested by the debtor,8° it appears that the
conclusion followed in the Latimer decision is the more desirable result.
To conclude otherwise would leave the prohibition meaningless in that
no penalty would attach to a violation on the part of creditors.
2. Defining "Primarily Consumer Debts"
The application of section 707(b) requires a determination of
whether the debtor's obligations are primarily consumer debts. 81 If
they are not, section 707(b) does not apply.82 The reason for the
distinction between consumer debts and those of a business nature is
not explained in the legislative history to section 707(b). The most
logical explanation lies in the fact that the major proponent of the
amendments was the consumer credit industry, which "perceived"'
that a large number of consumer debtors were "needlessly" discharging
84
millions of dollars of debt which they were fully capable of repaying.
At least one court has observed that the distinction between
consumer debts and debts of any other nature is a denial of equal

77. 56 Bankr. 415 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
78. Id. at 420.
79. Id.
80. The last sentence of Section 707(b) states that "tjhere shall be a
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor." 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b) (1988).
81. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
82. Id; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
83. There is some evidence that the increase of consumer bankruptcies has
not exceeded proportionately the increase in consumer borrowing brought about
by aggressive marketing by consumer credit providers. See Gross, supranote
3, at 76, 77; see also 130 CONG. REc. H1941 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1984) (statements of Rep. Rodino).
84. See generally Gross, supra note 3, at 61-62.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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protection because no rational basis appears for the distinction. 8 5 The
court did not analyze the issue, however, because the parties did not
brief or argue the equal protection argument. The In re Kelly Court did
not address the equal protection issue directly, but did note that laws
which "regulate economic activity not involving constitutionally
protected conduct are subject to a quite lenient test for constitutional
sufficiency."86
The determination of what is primarily consumer debt can have
serious consequences for the debtor. If the court determines that the
debt is nonconsumer in nature, then section 707(b) does not apply and
the debtor is eligible for the relief requested. If the court determines
that the debt is consumer debt, then the debtor may face dismissal
through the application of section 707(b). In In re Booth,87 the Fifth
Circuit dealt with this issue. The Booths, both physicians, had invested
in various real estate projects that were unsuccessful. The doctors filed
a bankruptcy petition listing total debts of $6 4 2 , 4 9 1.1 7 .88 The district
court had accepted the conclusion of the bankruptcy court that the debts
were primarily consumer in nature and had dismissed the case
pursuant to section 707(b).89 The district court had rested its conclusion on the determination that the signature loans were "unquestionably
consumer loans regardless of the use to which the debtor applie[d] the
funds."' 9 The Fifth Circuit rejected that reasoning and instead chose
to adopt the "profit motive" definition, stating that "the test for
determining whether a debt should be classified as a business debt,
rather than a debt acquired for personal, family, or household purposes,
is whether it was incurred with an eye toward profit.""1 The court
rejected the position taken in some courts 92 that debt secured by real
estate should be excluded from the definition of consumer debt. Thus,
the court included purchase money mortgages in the consumer debt
category. 93 In concluding its analysis, the court determined that

85. In re Keniston, 60 Bankr. 742, 744 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
86. In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Village of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982) and
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)).
87. 858 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 1055.
89. Id. at 1053.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1055.
92. In re Ikeda, 37Bankr. 193 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984); In re Nerminger, 32
Bankr. 624 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Randolph, 28 Bankr. 811 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1983); In re Stein, 18 Bankr. 768 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
93. Booth, 858 F.2d at 1055; see also In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908,912 (9th Cir.
1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss1/19
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"primarily," as used in section 707(b), meant those instances in which
consumer debt exceeds 50/ of the total debt of the debtor.9
3. Presumption In Favor of the Debtor
Section 707(b) expressly statels that "there shall be a presumption
in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor."9 5 Rather than
classifying this presumption as one of evidence, at least one circuit has
viewed it as "a caution and a reminder to the bankruptcy court that the
Code and the Congress favor the granting of bankruptcy relief."9
"[A]ccordingly 'the court should give the benefit of any doubt to the
debtor and dismiss a case only when a substantial abuse is clearly
present."' 97 Another court has concluded that it "should accord great
"
weight to the debtor's own assessment of [his] financial condition. 98
It seems appropriate then to apply section 707(b) with an eye toward
the effect that dismissal would have on the debtor as opposed to the
effect it would have on the creditor. 9
C. Application of the SubstantialAbuse Standard
Two courts of appeals have dealt with section 707(b) dismissal. The
Ninth Circuit heard the substantial abuse issue in In re Kelly.' °° In
that case, Thomas G. Kelly III, an attorney, and his wife had filed a
Chapter 7 petition following a judgment against them in the amount of
$21,980.63.'0' Before filing the petition, the Kellys had paid off all of
their other creditors, leaving only the judgment outstanding. 02 The
Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Kelly's petition as a substantial abuse
of the Code pursuant to section 707(b). 3 In the appeal that followed
the Kelly's argued, among other things, that their. ability to repay their
debts out of future income was irrelevant to the issue of substantial
abuse (a factor the lower court had focused on in ordering the dismissal
pursuant to section 707(b)).1°4 The Ninth Circuit dismissed this

94. Booth, 858 F.2d at 1055; see also Kelly, 841 F.2d at 913.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988).
96. Kelly, 841 F.2d at 917.
97. Id (quoting 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY T 707.08 (L. King 15th ed.
(1979)).
98. In re Edwards, 50 Bankr. 933, 938 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
99. In re Busbin, 95 Bankr. 240, 245 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
100. 841 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1988).
101. Id at 910.
102. Id. at 910-11.
103. Id.
104. I&
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contention, noting that other courts had determined, with few exceptions, that "the principal factor to be considered in determining
substantial abuse is the debtor's ability to repay the debts for which a
discharge is sought." 06 In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit looked to the
predecessor bills of section 707(b) and concluded that the elimination of
the future income test in the subsequent legislation was simply a
retrenchment from a mechanically applied threshold formula, which
"does not suggest that a debtor's ability to repay his debts is no longer
the primary consideration in determining whether there is abuse.""°
Using the committee report on the final version of S. 445,107 the court
determined that dismissal for substantial abuse is intended to uphold
creditors' interests in obtaining repayment when such repayment would
not be a burden. The report stated that "if a debtor can meet his debts
without difficulty as they become due, use of Chapter 7 would represent
a substantial abuse.""~s Thus, the court concluded that "[a]ccordingly,
we hold that the debtor's ability to pay his debts when due, as determined by his ability to fund a Chapter 13 plan, is the primary factor to
be considered in determining whether granting relief would be a
substantial abuse."'"
In In re Walton" ° the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower cour's
dismissal of the debtor's Chapter 7 petition as a substantial abuse of the
Code: The Bankruptcy Court had found from the record that the
debtor's monthly income exceeded his monthly expenses by $218.00.
According to the court's findings, this surplus would be sufficient to pay
off more than two-thirds of his debts under a three-year plan and 100%
of his debts under a five-year plan."' To the Bankruptcy Court, this
fact constituted a substantial abuse of Chapter 7; therefore, the court
dismissed the debtor's petition."2 On appeal the debtor asserted that
the legislative history of section 707(b) indicated that Congress
specifically had precluded courts from applying a future income test in
determining whether there was substantial abuse." 3 Like the Ninth
Circuit in Kelly, the Eighth Circuit declined to consider the comments
of the legislation's opponents, namely Senators Kennedy and Metzen-

105. Id. at 914.
106. Id.
107. This bill was the predecessor to the consumer credit amendments
ultimately passed by Congress which contained the amendment 707(b). See
supranotes 16-19 and accompanying text.
108. S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 53, 54 (1983).
109. Kelly, 841 F.2d at 914.
110. 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989).
111. Id. at 985.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 982.
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baum. Instead, it chose to look to the reports of the earlier versions of
the bill for the legislative intent surrounding the legislation."' The
court discounted the importance of the deletion of the future income
language from these earlier amendments, and concluded that this
deletion "does not foreclose the courts from considering, inter alia,..the
debtor's ability to pay his debts out of his future income."11 5 The
debtor advanced the argument that Congress had intended substantial
abuse to mean "bad faith" and that no evidence of bad faith was present
to constitute substantial abuse. 6 The majority, however, concluded
that such an interpretation was not logical in that such a narrow
construction "would needlessly duplicate other provisions of the Code
that have always required petitioners to file in good faith."" 7
The Walton court concluded that the record reflected the debtor had
a monthly surplus of $497.00 which would pay off 100% of his unsecured debts over a period of five years. "[T]hese facts adequately rebut
the statutory presumption in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) in favor of granting the
relief requested by the debtor."" 8
In a well reasoned dissent, Circuit Judge McMillian disagreed that
the debtor's petition fell within the scope of section 707(b) of the Code.
He reviewed the same language in the legislative history to section
707(b) and concluded that the future income analysis was not incorporated into the language of section 707(b) by the accompanying words
of legislative intent."9 Judge McMillian concluded that the court had
ignored the language of section 707(b) which indicates there shall be12°a
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
The dissent noted that the debtor had suffered:
[More than his share of mishaps: he has been ill; he and his wife
have separated and then been reunited; his home has been vandalized; his paycheck has sometimes been little more than $100.00 per
week because of garnishments and offsets. Yet, the majority opinion
of this panel, despite appellant's wretched financial conditions, would
deny him
a fresh start through a Chapter 7 liquidation bank12
ruptcy. 1

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 983.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 985..
Id. at 987 (McMillian, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 19
262

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

1. Problems In Applying the Standard
The problems presented by the application of section 707(b) are at
least threefold. First, determining whether debtors have sufficient
income to pay a large enough portion of their debts so that the granting
of Chapter 7 relief would constitute a substantial abuse of the Code
necessarily involves the judge in the day-to-day financial life of the
debtor.' Thus, the courts are required to determine the appropriateness of a debtor's personal expenditures. For example, in In re
Braley,1' the United States Trustee sought to disallow budgeted items
for the support of a son living at home who was over the age of
eighteen.' 24 The court responded, "I '1can't wait to get home to tell this
to my son who just turned eighteen."'
Consider the situation addressed by the court in In re Edwards.120
The court was forced to determine whether to allow a proposed one
Such situations
hundred dollar monthly religious contribution.12
highlight the problems created by the application of the substantial
abuse standard.
Certainly facts like those in In re Grant1' 2 cry out for the
application of the substantial abuse provision to dismiss the defendant's
liquidation petition. In Grant,the debtors had annual income exceeding
1
$65,000.00 and were unable to meet their financial obligations.
Among other items drawing the court's attention was the fact that the
debtor was driving a late model Mercedes automobile. The debtor filed
an amended schedule of expenses showing that he had returned the

122. See In re Braley, 103 Bankr. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989). The court's
opinion suggested tongue-in-cheek that the United States Trustee would be
reviewing a petitioner's lifestyle to determine whether or not he was eating too
many candy bars and smoking too many cigarettes and whether or not his
daughter's teeth really did in fact require braces. Id. at 759.
123. 103 Bankr. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
124. Id. at 760.
125. Id.
126. 50 Bankr. 933 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988)
127. Id. at 940. The court in Edwardsdid allow the contribution. However,
the court questioned "whether church contributions of $100 a month should
come ahead of repayment to creditors. ... At what point such inquires and
decisions by a bankruptcy court would become an affront to a society's
sensibilities or the U.S. Constitution remains uncertain." Id. at 940 n.9. See
also In re Gaulker, 63 Bankr. 224 (Banlr. D.N.D. 1986), in which the court
allowed a monthly religious contribution of $700.00 per month, stating, "this
Court is not so presumptuous as to inflict its personal views of religious and
financial responsibility upon [the debtors]." Id. at 226.
128. 51 Bankr. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
129. Id. at 386-87.
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Mercedes, but to replace it he had leased not one, but two brand new,
albeit smaller automobiles.3 In addition, listing Christmas expenses
in the amount of $9,000.00 received criticism from the court.'31 A
survey of the cases involving the substantial abuse issue, however,
rarely reVeal such egregious conduct on the part of the debtor.
A second problem created by the application of the substantial
abuse standard is the resulting lack of uniformity. What constitutes a
luxury to one judge is a necessity to another, and the definition of
substantial repayment of unsecured debts likely will not be the same in
different courts. Uniform treatment of
debtors and creditors alike is a
13 2
policy goal of the bankruptcy system.
A survey of the cases in which the substantial abuse standard has
been applied shows that no courts have applied the standard in
situations in which the debtor is unable to pay more than 50% of his or
her unsecured debts over the life of a plan. If this fifty percent level is
in fact a threshold as it appears to be, one has to wonder how long it
will be before attorneys begin counseling debtors to reduce their income,
at least temporarily, so they will fall below this threshold. The debtor
would qualify for Chapter 7 relief, with the unstated intention of
resuming employment after the discharge of the bankrupt's debts. Such
a situation is conceivable in the case of a married couple, where one of
the spouses has not been employed consistently outside the home or is
in a position of employment that provides no long-term career opportunities, but rather simply provides a second income for the family.
There is a possibility that the court would find that such conduct, by
itself, constitutes substantial abuse within the meaning of section 707(b)
or fraud within the meaning of section 727(a)."1
The difficulty of
proving fraud within the meaning of section 727(a) is highlighted by the
M
T
struggle the courts are having with the issue of exemption planning.
The court would review a myriad of factors to determine whether
terminating employment to circumvent application of a provision in the

130. Id. at 395.
131. Id. at 396. The court commented that "the Grant's Christmases must
be quite an extravaganza." Id.
132. In re Perrin's Marine Sales, Inc., 63 Bankr. 4, 8 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1985).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (1988).
134. A similar dispute has arisen over the issue of pre-petition exemption
planning. Exemption planning refers to the debtors' practice prior to the filing
of a bankruptcy petition of shifting all or part of their assets to assets which
would maximize the exemptions from seizure provided to them under state and
federal law. For a thorough discussion of this topic see, Koger & Reynolds, Is
PrefilingEngineeringPrudentPlanningOr Section 727 Fraud,93 CoM. L.J. 465
(1988).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 19

264

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

Bankruptcy Code would constitute fraud or substantial abuse. Such
factors would include the timing of the act and whether the debtor can
cite other reasons for the termination, such as distance to work,
parental concerns, or health. The point is that the determination would
be difficult and time consuming for an already heavily burdened
bankruptcy system. A judge faced with this situation would not be able
to order the debtor back to work and the debtor would have obtained the
desired access to Chapter 7 relief through the socially undesirable
avenue of unemployment."

IV. CONCLUSION
There can be no serious dispute about the desirability of requiring
those debtors who are able to pay their debts to pay them. The ability
of the debtor to repay debts out of future income, however, should be but
one of the factors considered by the courts in determining whether to
grant the relief requested or to dismiss the case due to substantial
abuse under section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. Application of the
substantial abuse standard as stated in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
where the ability to pay is the primary factor for consideration, makes
it just a matter of time before debtors adjust their income as an analog
to the so-called "exemption planning," thus neutralizing the value of the
substantial abuse standard."
Rather, courts should review the
particular circumstances of each individual debtor and apply the
standard so as to prevent the abuse of the bankruptcy system by

135. A similar situation has been faced in the domestic relation situation in
which one spouse retires early or reduces income and as a result is unable to
meet alimony or child support obligations. The courts are unable to order that
individual back to work because of the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. The response of some courts has been that while they
cannot force the individual to work, they will not relieve him of his obligation
and if the debtor does not meet it he will face contempt charges. This poses
difficult issues for the court and one would wonder whether the bankruptcy
courts would follow that reasoning because the strong public policy of providing
support for the family is not present in the bankruptcy context. Would a court
order a debtor back to work to make his monthly payments to creditors under
the threat of contempt?
136. Admittedly, the other factors which the courts have considered in
applying the substantial abuse standard, see supra note 56 and accompanying
text, would still possibly provide grounds for dismissal as a substantial abuse.
However, if the debtor had "adjusted" his or her. income so as to fall below the
50% threshold, this would effectively eliminate the "ability to pay" analysis.
Recall that both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal have considered
the ability to pay as the principal factor to be considered. See supranotes 100118 and accompanying text.
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undeserving debtors, while at the same time recognizing the historical
significance of the fresh start concept and the actual monetary recovery
that ultimately will be realized by creditors. 137
The substantial abuse standard should be applied in moderation
with full awareness of the presumption favoring the relief sought by.the
debtor. Its application should be confined to use in those instances in
which the actions of the debtor fall short of the "cause" standard of
section 707(a)"" and the fraud standard of section 727," but still
offend the sensibilities of the judge and leave him with the distinct
is seeking a "head start" as
impression that this particular debtor
140
opposed to the desired "fresh start."
ROBERT M. THOMPSON

137. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 19, at 1097-1102.
138. 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1988) allows the judge to dismiss a case filed under
Chapter 7 upon a finding of "cause" as defined in that subsection.
139. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1988); see supranotes 117-18 and accompanying text.
140. In re Kress, 57 Bankr. 874, 877-78 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
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